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Abstract
This paper explores a dynamic two-country model with production externalities in
which capital goods are not traded and international lending and borrowing are allowed.
Unlike the integrated world economy model based on the Heckscher-Ohlin setting, our
model yields indeterminacy of equilibrium under a wider set of parameter values than in
the corresponding closed economy model. Our ﬁnding demonstrates that the assumption
on trade structure would be a relevant determinant in considering the relation between
globalization and economic volatility.
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Does globalization enhance economic volatility? The equilibrium business cycle theory based
on indeterminacy and sunspots has presented two diﬀerent answers to this question. On
the one hand, authors such as Meng (2003), Meng and Velasco (2003 and 2004) and Weder
(2001) show that small-open economies with production externalities produce indeterminacy
of equilibrium under a wider set of parameter values than in the corresponding closed economy
model. Hence, according to these studies, internationalization of an economy may increase
economic volatility.1 Nishimura and Shimomura (2002a), on the other hand, reveal that a
world economy consisting of two symmetric countries with production externalities holds the
same stability conditions as those for a closed economy counterpart. In addition, Sim and Ho
(2007a) ﬁnd that if one of the two counties has no production externalities in Nishimura and
Shimomura’s model, then the equilibrium path of the world economy would be determinate
even though the country with production externalities exhibits autarkic indeterminacy. These
studies indicate that opening up international trade does not necessarily enhance economic
ﬂuctuations.
These opposite results seemingly stem from the diﬀerence in the analytical frameworks
used by the foregoing studies. The small-open economy models studied by Meng (2003) and
others are based on the partial equilibrium analysis in which behavior of the rest of the world is
exogenously given. In contrast, the models of world economy employ the general equilibrium
approach that treats the world economic system as a closed economy consisting of multiple
countries. The world economy models thus consider more complex interdependency between
the countries than that assumed in the small-open economy models. One may conjecture
that such a diﬀerence would generate the contrasting views as to the destabilizing eﬀect of
globalization.
The purpose of this paper is to reveal that the diﬀerence in conclusions mentioned above
mainly comes from the assumptions on trade structures rather than from the modelling
strategies. To conﬁrm this fact, we modify the model studied by Nishimura and Shimomura
1Lahiri (2001) also examines indeterminacy in a small-open economy model. Since he uses a somewhat
non-standard framework, the model needs a high degree of external increasing returns to yield indeterminacy.
Yong and Meng (2004) and Zhang (2008) also discuss equilibrium indeterminacy in small-open economies.
2(2002a) by introducing non-traded goods and international ﬁnancial transactions. Nishimura
and Shimomura (2002a) use the standard Heckscher-Ohlin framework where both investment
and consumption goods are freely traded but there is no intertemporal trade between the two
countries. We assume that consumption goods are internationally traded but investment
goods are non-tradables. Instead, it is assumed that international lending and borrowing
are possible. Unlike the Heckscher-Ohlin setting, in the presence of non-traded goods, the
factor price equalization fails to hold in our model. As a result, in our modiﬁed framework
the factor intensities of production sectors in the home and foreign countries may diﬀer from
each other. This means that the dynamic behavior of our model out of the steady state will
not be the same as that of a corresponding closed economy. Such a diﬀerence in transition
dynamics generates the divergence of determinacy conditions between the closed economy
and the integrated world economy consisting of symmetric countries.
Our main ﬁnding is that the equilibrium determinacy/indeterminacy conditions for the
world economy with non-traded goods and ﬁnancial transactions are similar to the stability
conditions for the small-open economy models. More speciﬁcally, we show that our model
may exhibit indeterminacy regardless of the restrictions on the preference structure. The
closed-economy version of our model, which is essentially the same as the integrated world
economy model of Nishimura and Shimomura (2002a), needs a high elasticity of intertemporal
substitution in consumption to hold indeterminacy. It is to be noted that most of the small-
open economy models with equilibrium indeterminacy assume the presence of international
lending and borrowing.2 Our study, therefore, demonstrates that even though the countries
in the world economy have identical technologies and preferences, the presence of non-traded
ﬁnal goods and ﬁnancial capital mobility would generate a divergence in dynamic behavior
of the integrated world economy and a closed, single country. In this sense, the structure of
international trade would be a relevant determinant for the relation between globalization
and economic volatility.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the basic as-
sumptions for the following discussion. Section 3 reformulates the model of Nishimura and
Shimomura (2002a) as a pseudo-planning problem and summarizes their conclusions. Section
2This is not the case for Nishimura and Shimomura (2002b) who explore the small-country version of the
dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model.
34m o d i ﬁes the planning problem in Section 3 in order to consider the presence of non-traded
capital goods and intertemporal trade. This section displays our main ﬁndings. Section 5
gives economic implications of our ﬁnding and Section 6 presents concluding remarks. Fi-
nally, the Appendix discusses the equivalence between the optimal solution of the planning
problem and the competitive equilibrium of our economy.
2 Baseline Setting
Consider a world economy consisting of two countries, home and foreign. Both countries
have the same production technologies. In each country there is a continuum of identical,
inﬁnitely-lived households. All the agents in both countries have an identical time discount
rate and the same form of instantaneous felicity functions. The consumption-saving decision
is made by the representative agent whose objective is to select the sequences of consumption
to maximize a discounted sum of utilities over an inﬁnite horizon. We assume that labor
supply is ﬁxed and each household supplies one unit of labor in each moment.
As for the production side of the model, it is assumed that there are two production
sectors in each country. The ﬁrst sector (i =1 )produces investment goods and the second
sector (i =2 )produces pure consumption goods. The production function of i-th sector in





i ¯ Xi,a i > 0,b i > 0, 0 <a i + bi < 1,i =1 ,2
where Yi, Ki and Li are i-th sector’s output, capital and labor input, respectively. Here ¯ Xi
denotes the sector and country-speciﬁc production externalities. We deﬁne:




i , αi >a i, 1 − αi >b i i =1 ,2.
If we normalizes the number of producers to one, then it holds that ¯ Ki = Ki and ¯ Li =
Li (i =1 ,2) in equilibrium.3 This means that the i-th sector’s social production technologies








i (.) is homogeneous of degree γ ∈ (0,1) in Ki and Li, while function E
i (.) is homogeneous
of degree 1 − γ.





i ,i =1 ,2.
Hence, the social technology satisﬁes constant returns to scale, while the private technology
exhibits decreasing returns to scale.4
We also assume that capital and labor are perfectly shiftable between the production
sectors within a country, but they cannot move across the border. Therefore, the full-
employment conditions for production factors are given by
K = K1 + K2, 1=L1 + L2,
where the total labor force is assumed to be unity.
As was assumed, the foreign country has the same production technologies as those of the
home country. It is also assumed that the labor force in the foreign country is normalized
to unity as well. Thus the home and foreign countries diﬀer only in their initial holdings of
capital stocks.
3 A Dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin Model
To emphasize the role of trade structure in dynamic world economy models, we ﬁrst sum-
marize the dynamic properties of the Hecksher-Ohlin model of the integrated world economy
with sector as well as country speciﬁc production externalities. For this purpose, we consider
a pseudo-planning problem whose solution mimics the competitive equilibrium of the world
economy. This approach simpliﬁes model manipulation and helps to clarify the diﬀerence
between the Heckscher-Ohlin setting and our model with non-traded goods and international
ﬁnancial transactions. The market economy version of the model in this section is discussed
in detail by Nishimura and Shimomura (2002a) and Sim and Ho (2007a).5
4Since the private technologies exhibit decreasing returns to scale, there exist positive proﬁts in both
production sectors. According to Benhabib and Nishimura (1998), we implicitly assume that there is an entry
barrier in each industry to generate positive proﬁts in each production sector.
5Nishimura and Shimomura’s study is based on the dynamic Hechscher-Ohlin models examined by, for
example, Chen (1992) and Stiglitz (1970).
53.1 A Pseudo-Planning Problem
In the standard Heckscher-Ohlin framework, it is assumed that both consumption and in-
vestment goods are tradables, but international lending and borrowing are impossible. In






dt, σ > 0, ρ > 0
subject to
˙ K = Y1 +ˆ pY2 − ˆ pC − δK, K0 = given (> 0),
where C is consumption, ˆ p denotes the world price of consumption good in terms of the invest-
ment good and δ ∈ (0,1) is the rate of capital depreciation. Similarly, the the representative








˙ K∗ = Y ∗
1 +ˆ pY ∗
2 − ˆ pC∗ − δK∗,K ∗
0 = given (> 0),
where asterisks denote corresponding foreign variables. The world market equilibrium con-
ditions for investment and consumption goods are respectively given by
˙ K + ˙ K∗ = Y1 + Y ∗
1 + δK + δK∗, (1)
C + C∗ = Y2 + Y ∗
2 . (2)
In the pseudo-planning formulation that corresponds to the market economy described





















1 − δKw, (3)










K = K1 + K2,K ∗ = K∗
1 + K∗
2, (5)
1=L1 + L2, 1=L∗
1 + L∗
2, (6)
6Kw = K + K∗, (7)
together with the given initial levels of capital stocks, K0 and K∗
0. Here, Kw stands for
the aggregate capital stock in the world economy at large. In addition, μ∗ in the objective
function denotes a constant welfare weight on the instantaneous felicity of the foreign agents
relative to the felicity in the home country. This value should be selected to make the
planning solution equivalent to the competitive equilibrium. Constraints (3) and (4) are the
equilibrium conditions for investment and consumption goods, respectively. Equations (5)
and (6) represent the resource constraints in each country. Following Kehoe et al. (1992),
we assume that in solving this problem the planner takes the sequences of external eﬀects,






t=0 (i =1 ,2), as given.



















A2 (K − K1)
a2 (1 − L1)
b2 ¯ X2 + A2 (K∗ − K∗
1)




−C − C∗]+φ(Kw − K − K∗).
In the above, q denotes the implicit price the aggregate capital, Kw, and λ and φ are La-
grangian multipliers. It is easy to see that q/λ corresponds to 1/ˆ p, that is, the price of
investment good in terms of consumption good in the decentralized world economy.6 The
necessary conditions for an optimum include the following:














1 ¯ X1 − λb2A2Ka
2L
b2−1































2 − φ =0 , (13)
6Notice that λ equals the marginal utility of consumption and q equals the marginal value of capital in
terms of utility. Therefore, q/λ denotes the value of investment good in terms of consumption good.
7˙ q = q(ρ + δ) − φ, (14)
lim
t→∞
qe−ρtKw =0 . (15)
Equations (8) through (13) display the ﬁrst-order conditions for maximizing the Hamiltonian
function with respect to the control variables, C, C∗,K 1,L 1,K ∗
1,L ∗
1,Kand K∗ under given
levels of ¯ Xi and ¯ X∗
i (i =1 ,2). Equation (14) is the canonical equation of the costate variable
for the aggregate capital, Kw, and (15) is the transversality condition.
3.2 Equilibrium Dynamics of the Integrated Economy

























From the equilibrium conditions, ¯ Ki = Ki, ¯ Li = Li, ¯ K∗
i = K∗
i ,and ¯ L∗
i = L∗




















































As shown by the above conditions, because of the symmetry of the two countries, the factor
intensities of the social technology in both countries are the same: Ki/Li = K∗
i /L∗
i (i =1 ,2).
Denoting q/λ ≡ p, from (19) we can express the capital intensities in the following manner:
Ki/Li = K∗
i /L∗
i = ki (p),i =1 ,2.
The full-employment conditions in each country (5) and (6) are respectively summarized
as
L1k1 (p)+( 1− L1)k2 (p)=K,
L∗
1k1 (p)+( 1− L∗
1)k2 (p)=K∗.
8In view of these full-employment conditions, we may express the social level of investment
good output in each country as follows:
Y1 = L1A1k1 (p)
α1 =
K − k2 (p)







K∗ − k2 (p)
k1 (p) − k2 (p)
A1k1 (p)
α1 . (21)
From (1), (20) and (21), we see that the dynamic equation for the aggregate capital of the
world economy is given by
˙ Kw =
Kw − 2k2 (p)
k1 (p) − k2 (p)
A1k1 (p)
α1 − δKw. (22)
Equations (9), (13) and (14) yield the dynamic behavior of the shadow value of Kw :
˙ q = q
h




Equations in (8) mean that C∗/C = μ∗−1/σ ≡ ¯ m for all t ≥ 0. Since the households in both
counties have an identical form of homothetic utility function, the relative level of optimal




2 =( 1− L∗
1)A2kα
2, the world market equilibrium condition for consumption goods (4) is
expressed as
(1 + ¯ m)λ− 1
σ =
2k1 (p) − Kw
k1 (p) − k2 (p)
A2k2 (p)
α2 . (24)
This equation shows that the equilibrium level of λ can be expressed as λ = λ(Kw,p;¯ m).




≡ π(Kw,q;¯ m). (25)
Plugging (25) into (22) and (23) yields a complete dynamics system of the integrated world
economy with respect to Kw and q.
Inspecting dynamic system (22) and (23), Nishimura and Shimomura (2002a) conﬁrm
that the steady state of the world economy where both countries imperfectly specialize is
uniquely given under weak restrictions on parameter values. Then they show the following
proposition:
9Proposition 1 (Nishimura and Shimomura 2002a) The steady-state equilibrium of the world
is locally indeterminate if (i) the investment good sector is more capital intensive than the
consumption good sector from the social perspective but it is less capital intensive from the
private perspective, and (ii) the elasticity of intertemproal substitution in consumption, 1/σ,
is suﬃciently high.7
Given the conditions shown above, the steady state of the aggregate dynamic system is a
sink so that there is a continuum of converging paths towards the steady-state equilibrium.
Either if the social and private factor intensity rankings are the same or if the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution in consumption is low enough, the dynamic system of the inte-
grated world economy exhibits saddlepoint stability and, hence, the competitive equilibrium
is at least locally determinate. As pointed out by Sim and Ho (2007b), the Heckscher-Ohlin
model of two symmetric countries with constant-returns-to-scale technologies and homothetic
preferences has the same dynamic properties as those of the corresponding closed economy.
Therefore, the suﬃcient conditions for holding equilibrium indeterminacy shown above are
essentially the same conditions for the closed economy with sector-speciﬁc externalities and
social constant returns examined by Benhabib and Nishimura (1998).8 This result demon-
strates that in the standard Heckscher-Ohlin world with symmetric countries, opening up
international trade neither enhances nor diminishes economic volatility of each country.
When we consider the distributional dynamics between the two countries, it should be
noted that the equilibrium trajectory of the world economy depends on ¯ m: see equation (25).
Nishimura and Shimomura (2002a) show that if the competitive equilibrium is indeterminate,
the value of ¯ m
¡
= μ∗−1/σ¢
cannot be pinned down by the initial distribution of capital stocks,
K0 and K∗
0, alone. In the dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin world, the steady-state levels of K and






(1 − α1)a2b1(ρ + δ)+α1a1 [ρb2 + δb1a2 +( 1− a1)b2δ]
(a2b1 − a1b2)(α1 − α2)[ρ + δ(1 − a1)]

to establish local indeterminacy in the steady-state equilibrium.
8In discussing two-sector closed economy model, Benhabib and Nishimura (1998) assume that the instan-
taneous utility function is linear in consumption (i.e. σ =0 ). Hence, their model exhibits indeterminacy if
condition (i) in Proposition 1 is satisﬁed. In the two-sector endogenous growth model with physical and human
capital, condition (i) in Proposition 1 is suﬃcient for establishing indeterminacy: see Benhabib et al. (2000)
and Mino (2001).
10K∗ are path dependent and they are determined by the initial values of K0 and K∗
0, if the
converging path is determinate. If indeterminacy holds, then the level of ¯ m is indeterminate
as well, and thus the terminal distribution of capital stocks in the steady state equilibrium is
also indeterminate. As a result, the steady-state levels of relative factor endowment (so the
steady-state patterns of international trade) may be aﬀected by sunspot-driven ﬂuctuations.9
4 A Model with Non-Tradable Capital
We now assume that consumption goods are internationally traded but investment goods are
non-tradables. Instead, we assume that international lending and borrowing are allowed. In
our modelling, the international transaction of ﬁnancial asset means that households in both
home and foreign countries can trade ownership of their capital stocks, while neither installed
physical capital nor ﬁnal goods for new investment can cross the border.10 Although such
an assumption is restrictive one, it helps to elucidate the eﬀect of the presence of non-traded
goods in comparison with the case of free trade of ﬁnal goods in the Heckscher-Ohlin model
discussed in the previous section. Additionally, since a large portion of investment goods
includes construction and structures, the investment goods sector shares a larger part of
nontradables than the consumption good sector.11
4.1 Decentralized Economy
Suppose that both home and foreign countries produce investment as well as pure consump-
tion goods. Consumption goods produced in each country is homogeneous and they are
internationally traded. Investment goods are traded in the domestic market alone. Although
installed physical capital are not shiftable internationally, households in each country can
9See also Nishimura and Shimomura (2006) for further investigation on equilibrium indeterminacy in the
dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model.
10The structure of our model is one of the dependent economy models discussed in open-economy macro-
economics literature. Sen and Turnovsky (1995) treat a small-open economy model with non-tradable capital
and Turnovsky (1996, Chapter 7) studies a neoclassical two-country, two-sector model in which capital goods
are not traded. See also Chapter 5 in Turnousky (2009) for a brief review of dependent economy models.
11Bems (2008) ﬁnds that the share of investment expenditure on non-traded goods is about 60%. and that
this ﬁgure has been considerably stable over the last 50 years both in developed and developing countries.
11own capital stock in the other country.12 Let us denote the capital stocks domiciled in the
home (resp. foreign) country owned by the domestic and foreign households by Kh and Kf
(resp. K∗
h and K∗
f). Then it holds that




Thus the net foreign asset position, i.e. the net stock of traded bonds, held by the home and
foreign households are respectively deﬁned as
B = p∗K∗
h − pKf,
B∗ = −B = pKf − p∗K∗
h
where p and p∗ respectively denote price of investment good in terms of the consumption
goods in the home and foreign countries. (It is to be noted that since the investment goods
are nontradables, the price of investment goods in the home country, p, may not be the
same as p∗ determined in the foreign country.) Here, B and B∗ a r em e a s u r e di nt e r m so ft h e
(homogeneous) consumption goods. Thus the net wealth (in terms of consumption goods)
held by the home and foreign households are given by
Ω = pK + B, Ω∗ = p∗K∗ + B∗
Since B and B∗ are measured by consumption goods, the non-arbitrage conditions be-




= R = r∗ +
˙ p∗
p∗, (26)
where R i st h ei n t e r e s tr a t eo nb o n d s ,a n dr and r∗ respectively denote denote the net rate
of return to capital in the home and foreign countries.
Given the above setting, the optimization problem for the representative household in the







12In this paper we assume a simple form of asset structure. For the relevance of asset structure of foreign
trade in the real business cycle studies, see Baxter and Crucini (1995).
12subject to the ﬂow budget constraint
˙ Ω = RΩ + w + π1 + π2 − C, (27)










Ωt ≥ 0 (28)
together with the initial capital holdings of Ω0. In the above, wt the real wage in terms of
consumption goods, and π1 and π2 are the excess proﬁts generated by the investment and
consumption goods production.13








˙ Ω∗ = RΩ∗ + w∗ + π∗
1 + π∗












and the initial conditions. The market equilibrium conditions for investment goods in the
home and foreign countries are
I = Y1, I∗ = Y ∗
1 . (30)
The international market equilibrium condition for consumption goods and bonds are respec-
tively given by
C + C∗ = Y2 + Y ∗
2 , (31)
B + B∗ =0 . (32)
In addition, as shown in the Appendix, the ﬂow budget constraint for the households and
the market equilibrium conditions for investment goods, the change in net asset position, i.e.
the current account, of each country is
˙ B = RB + Y2 − C, (33a)
13It is assumed that the proﬁts earned by the ﬁrms are distributed back to the households. Since we have
assumed that a part of domestic capital may be owned by the foreign households, it is rather arbitrary to
assume that the proﬁts of domestic industries are entirely owned by the domestic households. However, the
pattern of proﬁt distribution does not aﬀect the optimal consumption/savings decision of the households, so
that we ignore the relation between the ownership of capital and international proﬁt distribution.
13˙ B∗ = RB∗ + Y ∗
2 − C∗. (33b)






















t ≥ 0. (34a)
Finally, the production side of the economy is the same as that of the Hechscher-Ohlin
model in the previous section. Proﬁt maximization of both sectors equates the private mar-




1 − δ = a2A2k
α2−1








1 − δ = a2A2k
∗α2−1






Again, we assume that both factor inputs are not traded so that the full employment condi-
tions in both countries are:
K = K1 + K2,K ∗ = K∗
1 + K∗
2
1=L1 + L2, 1=L∗
1 + L∗
2.
4.2 A Pseudo-Planning Problem
As shown in the Appendix of the main text, the competitive equilibrium of the world econ-
omy can be characterized by the solution of the following pseudo-planning problem. In this
















1 ¯ X1 − δK,
















K = K1 + K2,K ∗ = K∗
1 + K∗
2,
1=L1 + L2, 1=L∗
1 + L∗
2,
as well as to the initial levels of K0 and K∗
0. The diﬀerence between the planning problem
given above and one discussed in the previous section is that in the present regime each
country has its own capital accumulation equation due to the assumption that investment
goods are not internationally traded.





















A2 (K − K1)
a2 (1 − L1)
b2 ¯ X2 + A2 (K∗ − K∗
1)
a2 (1 − L∗
1)
b2 ¯ X∗
2 − C − C∗
i
,
where q and q∗ are the shadow values of capital stock in the home and foreign country,
respectively. In what follows, we focus on the interior solution in which both countries
imperfectly specialize in producing consumption and investment goods. The control variables
in this problem are C, C∗,K 1,L 1,K ∗
1 and L∗
1, w h i l et h es t a t ev a r i a b l e sa r eK and K∗. In
parallel with the optimization in the previous section, we ﬁnd that the necessary conditions
for au optimum include the following :














1 ¯ X1 − λb2A2Ka
2L
b2−1





















2 =0 , (40)




2 ¯ X2, (41)








e−ρtqK =0 , lim
t→∞
e−ρtq∗K∗ =0 . (43)
154.3 Dynamic System
Again, we deﬁne q/λ ≡ p and q∗/λ ≡ p∗, which represent the prices of consumption goods in
terms of investment goods in the home and foreign countries, respectively. Then we replace









































































α2−α1 ≡ k1 (p∗). (44b)












































α2−α1 ≡ k2 (p∗).
These expressions show that
sign k0
i (p)=sign k0
i (p∗)=sign (α2 − α1),i =1 ,2. (45)
Here, the sign of
∆p = α1 − α2
represents the factor intensity ranking from the social perspective. When ∆p is positive
(negative), the aggregate technology of investment good sector is more (less) capital intensive
than that of the consumption good sector.
Note that we have restricted our attention to the interior equilibrium in which both
countries imperfectly specialize in producing consumption and investment goods. To ensure
this restriction, we assume that relative price in each country satisﬁes the following condition:
0 <L 1 =
K − k2 (p)




K∗ − k2 (p∗)
k1 (p∗) − k2 (p∗)
< 1. (46b)
Using functions k1 (p) and k2 (p). we see that capital accumulation equation in each country
is written as
˙ K = y1 (K,p) − δK, (47)
˙ K∗ = y1 (K∗,p ∗) − δK∗, (48)
where
y1 (K,p) ≡
K − k2 (p)
k1 (p) − k2 (p)
A1k1 (p)
α1 , (49)
y1 (K∗,p ∗) ≡
K∗ − k2 (p∗)
k1 (p∗) − k2 (p∗)
A1k1 (p∗)
α1 . (50)






















(α1 − α2) (51b)







shows the factor intensity ranking from the private perspective.
The shadow values of capital in both countries change according to
˙ q = q[ρ + δ − r(p)], (52)
˙ q∗ = q∗ [ρ + δ − r(p∗)], (53)
where r(p) ≡ a1A1k1 (p)
α1−1 and r(p∗) ≡ a1A1k1 (p∗)
α1−1 . Dynamic equations (47), (48), (52)
and (53) depict behaviors of capital stocks and implicit prices of capital in the home and for-
eign countries.
To derive a complete dynamic system, we should relate p and p∗ to K, K∗,qand q∗. The
world market equilibrium condition for the consumption good in the Heckscher-Ohlin world
(equation (24)) is now replaced with
(1 + ¯ m)λ− 1
σ = y2 (K,p)+y2 (K∗,p ∗), (54)
17where ¯ m = μ∗−1/σ and
y2 (K,p)=
k1 (p) − K




k1 (p∗) − K∗
k1 (p∗) − k2 (p∗)
A2k2 (p∗)
α2 . (56)






















(α1 − α2). (57b)
In view of (54), we see that λ is expressed as a function of capital stocks, prices and ¯ m :
λ =( 1 + ¯ m)
σ [y2 (K,p)+y2 (K∗,p ∗)]σ
≡ λ(K,K∗,p,p ∗;¯ m). (58)









Solving these equations with respect to p and p∗ yields the following expressions:
p = π(K,K∗,q,q∗;¯ m), (59)
p∗ = π∗ (K,K∗,q,q∗;¯ m). (60)
Substituting (59) and (60) into (47), (48), (52) and (53), we obtain a complete dynamic
system that depicts the behaviors of K, K∗,qand q∗.
4.4 Equilibrium Indeterminacy
First, let us characterize the stationary equilibrium of the world economy. The steady state
of the dynamic system derived above is established when ˙ K = ˙ K∗ = ˙ q = ˙ q∗ =0 . From (59)
and (60) the relative price in the home and foreign countries, p and p∗, also stay constant in
the steady-state equilibrium. As for the existence of a feasible steady state, we can conﬁrm
the following:
18Proposition 2 There exists a unique steady state in which both countries imperfectly spe-
cialize.
Proof. When ˙ q = ˙ q∗ =0in (52) and (53), it holds that
a1A1k1 (p)
α1−1 = a1A1k1 (p∗)
α1−1 = ρ + δ.
Thus by use of (44a) and (44b), we ﬁnd that
















Thus the steady-state levels of p and p∗ are uniquely given and it holds that p = p∗ in the
steady state. The steady-state levels of capital stocks satisfying ˙ K = ˙ K∗ =0in (47) and
(48) are determined by the following conditions:
K − k2 (p)
k1 (p) − k2 (p)
A1k1 (p)
α1 = δK,
K∗ − k2 (p∗)
k1 (p∗) − k2 (p∗)
A1k1 (p∗)
α1 = δK∗
Using the conditions for ˙ p = ˙ p∗ =0and the fact that p = p∗ holds in the steady state, we
ﬁnd that the steady-state level of capital stock in each county has the same value, which is
given by
K = K∗ =
(aA1)
1













which has a positive value. In view of the steady-state levels of p and K derived above, the













Hence, (46a) and (46b) are fulﬁlled so that both countries imperfectly specialize. In addition,
when p, p∗,Kand K∗ are given, from (54) the steady-state value of λ is uniquely determined
as well, implying that q = pλ and q∗ = p∗λ are also uniquely given in the steady state
equilibrium.
In order to inspect local stability of the steady state, the following facts are useful:




K∗ (K∗,p ∗),i =1 ,2,
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Proof. By the functional forms of yi
j (·) (i =1 ,2,j= K,K∗,p,p ∗), it is easy to see
that yi
K (K,p)=yi
K∗ (K∗,p ∗) and yi
p (K,p)=yi
p∗ (K∗,p ∗) are established when p = p∗ and


















































Since λK(·)=λK∗ (·) and λp (·)=λp∗ (·) in the steady state where K = K∗ and p = p∗,w e
obtain πK = π∗
K = πK∗ = π∗, πq = π∗
q∗ and πq∗ = π∗
q.
We now inspect the dynamic behavior of our economy. As for local determinacy of the
steady state, we ﬁnd the following:
Proposition 3 The steady-state equilibrium in the model with non-tradable capital is locally
indeterminate, if the investment good sector is more capital intensive than the consumption
good sector from the social perspective but it is less capital intensive from the private perspec-
tive.
20Proof. Let us linealize the dynamic system of (47), (48), (52) and (53) at the steady
state. The coeﬃcient matrix of the linealized system is given by
J =
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
y1





















⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
.
In view of Lemma 1, the characteristic equation of J is written as
Γ(η)=d e t [ ηI − J]
=d e t
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
η − (y1






pπK η − (y1




qr0πK qr0πK η + qr0πq qr0πq∗
qr0πK qr0πK qr0πq η + qr0πq
⎤













0 η − (y1
K − δ)0 η
qr0πK qr0πK η + qr0πq qr0πq∗
qr0πK qr0πK qr0πq∗ η + qr0πq
⎤










η + qr0(πq − πq∗)
¤
ξ (η).
where η denotes the characteristic root of J and
ξ (η) ≡ η2 +
£













Our assumptions mean that a1
b1 − a2
b2 < 0 and α1 − α2 > 0. Thus from (57a) we see that
y1
K − δ < 0. In addition, note that from (61c) it holds that πq − πq∗ =1 /λ(> 0). Hence,
using r(p) ≡ a1A1k1 (p)
α1−1 , we obtain:





As a consequence, at least two roots of Γ(η)=0have negative real parts. Equations in (61c)
also show























y2 (K,p)+y2 (K∗,p ∗)
¤− 1
σ−1 < 0.
Therefore, in the steady state equilibrium. the following holds:









Notice that under our assumptions, it holds that y2
p (K,p) > 0. Suppose that σ is small
enough to satisfy σ <p y 2





(πq + πq∗) < 0.
This means that ξ (η)=0has one positive and one negative roots. As a result, Γ(η)=0
has three stable roots. Hence, if σ is smaller than the price elasticity of supply function of
consumption goods, then there locally exists a continuum of equilibrium paths converging to
the steady state.
Now suppose that σ is larger than py2























p < 0 and y2






(πq + πq∗) > 0,







These conditions mean that ξ (η)=0has two roots with negative real parts and, hence, all
the roots of Γ(η)=0a r es t a b l eo n e s .I ns u m ,i f∆p = a1
b1 − a2
b2 < 0 and ∆s = α1 − α2 > 0,
then the characteristic equation of the linearlized system involves at least three stable roots,
meaning that the converging path towards the steady state is locally indeterminate.
22It is to be emphasized that, as the above proposition shows, in our setting indetermi-
nacy may emerge regardless of the magnitude of σ. This is in contrast to the conclusion in
Nishimura and Shimomura (2002a) showing that the indeterminacy conditions involve a high
elasticity of substitution in consumption, 1/σ. Since the closed economy version of our model
is the same as that of Nishimura and Shimomura (2002a), we need the same condition for
holding indeterminacy if our model economy is closed. Hence, our result shows that the ﬁnan-
cially integrated world with non-tradable capital goods tends to produce indeterminacy under
a wider range of parameter spaces than in the closed economy counterpart. In this sense,
our model claims that internationalization may enhance the possibility of sunspot-deriven
economic ﬂuctuations.
Finally, to complete our stability analysis, we summarize the ﬁndings for the other cases.
Proposition 4 (i) If the private and the social factor-intensity rankings are the same, then
the steady-state equilibrium is locally determinate, and (ii) if the capital good sector is more
capital intensive than the consumption good sector from the private perspective but it is less
capital intensive from the social perspective, then the steady state is unstable.





























(α1 − α2) > 0,we obtain
sign [−qr0(y1





because sign λp = −sign y2




> 0. As a results, Γ(η)=0has two stable
and two unstable roots, so that there is a unique converging path around the steady state.
(ii) If a1
b1 − a2
b2 > 0 and α1−α2 < 0, then λp < 0. Hence, in this case the sign of πq +πq∗ is not
determined without imposing further restrictions. In the case of πq + πq∗ > 0, we have two
positive eigenvalues, r0 (πq + πq∗) > 0 and y1





(πq + πq∗) < 0,
23then ξ (η)=0has one positive and one negative root. If πq + πq∗ > 0, we see that
r0 (πq + πq∗) < 0 and y1





(πq + πq∗) < 0,q r 0 (πq + πq∗) < 0,
−(y1
K − δ) < 0, −2y1
pπK < 0,
then ξ (η)=0has two positive roots. Therefore, regardless of the sign of πq + πq∗, Γ(η)=0
has only one stable root and thus the steady state equilibrium is locally unstable.If a1
b1 − a2
b2 > 0
and α1 − α2 < 0, then r0 (πq + πq∗) > 0 and y1





(πq + πq∗) < 0,
so that ξ (η)=0has one positive and one negative root. This reveals that Γ(η)=0has only
one stable root and thus the steady-state equilibrium is locally unstable.
These results are also close to the stability conditions for the small open economy models
with capital mobility examined by Meng and Velasco (2003 and 2004). This proposition
gain emphasizes that the dynamic behavior of the ﬁnancially integrated world economy with
symmetric countries and non-traded capital goods is closer to the behavior of corresponding
small-open economy rather than to the closed economy counterpart.
5 Discussion
5.1 The Steady-State Characterization and Equilibrium Determinacy
As was stated in Section 3.2, if the perfect-foresight competitive equilibrium is indeterminate
in the dynamic Hechscher-Ohlin model, the steady-state capital distribution between the
two countries cannot be selected by the initial distribution of capital alone. Hence, sunspot-
deriven changes in expectations may aﬀect the equilibrium path towards the steady state,
which means that the long-run pattern of trade also depends on expectations formation
of agents in the world market. In contrast, since the ﬁnal goods for investment are not
internationally traded in our model, the steady-state level of physical capital in each country
is uniquely determined regardless of the presence of equilibrium indeterminacy.
24It is to be noted that in our economy the long-run level of ﬁnancial asset holding in
each country would be aﬀected by determinacy/indeterminacy of equilibrium. This result is
summarized as follows:
Proposition 5 If the steady-state equilibrium of the world economy is locally determinate
(indeterminate), then the steady-state level of asset position of each country is determinate
(indeterminate).
Proof. From (54) in which p = p∗ and K = K∗ in the steady state, the equilibrium
condition is written as
(1 + ¯ m)C =2 y2 (K,p). (62)
Since the steady-sate levels of p and K are uniquely determined, the magnitude of total
consumption demand, (1 + ¯ m)C, is uniquely given as well. When the equilibrium path is
determinate, there at least locally exists a two-dimensional stable manifold on which the
implicit prices of capital stocks are uniquely expressed by the following functions:
qt = q(Kt,K∗
t , ¯ m); q∗
t = q∗ (Kt,K∗
t , ¯ m).
Thus (59) and (60) show that in the initial period p and p∗ are written as p0 =ˆ π (K0,K∗
0, ¯ m)
and p∗
0 =ˆ π∗ (K0,K∗
0, ¯ m). Using these functions and (58), we may express the initial value of
λ in the following manner:
λ0 = λ(K0,K∗
0, ˆ π(K0,K∗
0, ¯ m), ˆ π∗ (K0,K∗
0, ¯ m);¯ m).
As a result, (36) and (62) yield:
(1 + ¯ m)[λ(K0,K∗
0, ˆ π (K0,K∗
0, ¯ m), ˆ π∗ (K0,K∗
0, ¯ m);¯ m)]
−1/σ =2 y2 (K,p).
This equation may determine the level of ¯ m
¡
= μ∗−1/σ¢
. If there is a unique level of ¯ m
satisfying the above, it depends on the initial capital distribution (K0,K∗
0) as well as on
the steady-state levels of p and K. Once ¯ m is uniquely selected, then the values of C and
C∗(= ¯ mC) in the steady state are also uniquely given.14
In contrast, if the steady state of the world economy is locally indeterminate, the stable
manifold has at least three dimensions so that the implicit prices of capital cannot be functions
14See also Appendix for determination of ¯ m.
25of Kt,K ∗
t and ¯ m. If this is the case, ¯ m cannot be uniquely determined by K0,K∗
0 and the
steady-state values of p and K. This means that the stead-state levels of C and C∗ are
indeterminate. Note that the from the ﬂow budget constraints for the households in the
decentralized economy, in the steady state it holds that RΩ+w−C =0and ΩR+w∗−C∗ =0 .
Therefore, the steady state level of net asset positions are:
B =
y2 (K,p) − C
ρ + δ
=
(¯ m − 1)
(1 + ¯ m)(ρ + δ)
y2 (K,p), (63a)
B∗ =
y2 (K,p) − ¯ mC
ρ + δ
=
(1 − ¯ m)
(1 + ¯ m)(ρ + δ)
y2 (K,p). (63b)
Since ¯ m cannot be uniquely given in the case of presence of equilibrium indeterminacy, the
long-run levels of net asset position are indeterminate as well.
Equations (63a) and (63b) demonstrate that the net asset position of each country in
the steady state entirely depends upon the level of ¯ m. If the equilibrium is determinate, ¯ m
is uniquely determined at the initial period,. Hence, for example, if the home country is a
creditor at the outset, we tend to have ¯ m>1, s ot h a tt h eh o m ec o u n t r yw i l lb eac r e d i t o r
in the long-run equilibrium as well. In the equilibrium is indeterminate, then the level of
¯ m may not reﬂect the asset positions in the initial period. This implies that the long-run
asset positions cannot be predicted without specifying expectations of the households in both
countries.
5.2 The Case of Small-Open Economy
When we examine the small-country counterpart of our model, we simply solve the repre-
sentative household in the home country by ﬁxing the interest rate on net wealth: R = ¯ R
for all t ≥ 0, where ¯ R denotes an exogenously given world interest rate. In this case, the
non-arbitrage condition between holding bonds and capital becomes
˙ p
p
= ¯ R − r = ¯ R − αAk1 (p)
α−1 .
Therefore, the behavior of the relative price is independent of quantity side of the economy,
so that from (45) the stability of relative price depends only on the sign of k0
1 (p),i . e . t h e
social factor intensity ranking, ∆p = α1−α2.. In addition to this price equation, the quantity
26system is given by the equilibrium condition for the investment goods market:
˙ K = y1 (K,p) − δK.
Meng and Velasco (2004) demonstrate that as for the dynamic system given above, the factor-
intensity ranking conditions presented in Proposition 3 are necessary and suﬃcient for holding
local indeterminacy in the small-open economy with non-traded capital. Remember that
Proposition 3 means that the factor-intensity ranking condition is not necessary but suﬃcient
for generating indeterminacy, implying that the possibility of equilibrium indeterminacy in
the world economy is higher than that in the small-open economy. The main reasons for
this result is that the interest rate, R, in an endogenous variable in the two-country model.
The world interest rate depends on the both prices and capital stocks of two counties, which
enhances the range of parameter values under which the steady-state equilibrium is locally
indeterminate.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has investigated the relation between trade structure and equilibrium indetermi-
nacy in a two country world. We have introduced non-traded capital goods and international
ﬁnancial transactions into the dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model with production externalities
examined by Nishimura and Shimomura (2002a). Our extension has demonstrated that the
introduction of non-traded goods and ﬁnancial asset mobility enhances the range of parame-
ter values under which the perfect-foresight competitive equilibrium of the world economy
is indeterminate. Since the standard Heckscher-Ohlin setting used by Nishimura and Shi-
momura (2002a) establishes the same stability conditions as these held in the corresponding
closed economy, our ﬁnding indicates that the assumptions of trade structure of the world
economy would be a critical determinant in considering relation between globalization and
economic volatility.
The world economy as a whole is a closed economy in which there are heterogenous
countries. Therefore, its model structure is similar to that of a closed, single economy model
with heterogenous agents. In particular, if consumption and saving decisions are made by the
representative household in each country, the behavior of the world economy model is closely
27connected to that of the closed economy model with heterogenous households. There is,
however, a key diﬀerence between the world economy and the single country settings: when
dealing with the world economy model, we should specify the transaction structure between
the countries. Both of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory and the discussion in this paper assume
speciﬁc structures of international trade. It is worth investigating how our conclusion would
be modiﬁed under alternative forms of international trade.15
In the literature on indeterminacy and sunspots, some authors have explored how the
presence of heterogenous households may alter the determinacy/indeterminacy conditions in
the real business cycle models with market distortions. These studies have shown that the
heterogeneity of agents often aﬀects stability condition in a critical manner.16 As mentioned
in Section 1, Sim and Ho (2007a) reveal that the introduction of technological heterogeneity
into the Nishimura-Shimomura model may produce a substantial change in equilibrium in-
determinacy results. Those existing ﬁndings suggest that it is worth extending our model by
considering further heterogeneity between the two countries in order to consider the impact
of globalization on aggregate stability in a more general framework than the present paper.
Appendix
In this appendix we show that the pseudo-planning problem discussed in the main text
characterizes the competitive equilibrium of the decentralized world economy.17 For this
purpose, we ﬁr s td e r i v et h eo p t i m i z a t i o nc o nditions of the households and ﬁrms in both
countries.





+ ζ (RΩ + w + π1 + π2 − C),
where ζ denotes the implicit value of net wealth. The necessary conditions for an optimum
15In the trade theory literature, the relation between equilibrium characterization of the world economy and
trade structures have been discussed extensively: see, for example, Ethier and Svensson (1986) and Cremers
(1997). We may use the results obtained in those studies to extend our argument.
16See, for example, see Ghiglino and Olszak-Duquenne (2005).
17See Hu and Mino (2009) for a detailed analysis of the market economy version of the model,
28include the following:
C−σ = ζ, (A1)
˙ ζ = ζ (ρ − R), (A2)
together with the transversality conditions: limt→∞ e−ρtζtΩt =0 . Note that the transver-
sality condition means that the non-Ponzi-game restriction holds with an equality. Proﬁt


















2 ¯ X2. (A4)
From the non-arbitrage condition (26) we obtain











In the same vein, we obtain the conditions for the foreign country corresponding to the
above as follows:
C∗−σ = ζ∗ (A6)
˙ ζ
∗





























1 − δ +
˙ p∗
p∗. (A10)
It is seen that if we set p = q/λ and p∗ = q∗/λ, then (A3), (A4), (A8) and (A9) respectively
correspond to (37) through (40) in the planning problem. Furthermore, by use of (A5), (A10),





























This relation can be obtained from
˙ q
q











29w h i c hr e s p e c t i v e l yc o r r e s p o n dt o(41) and (42).
To examine the relation between the transversality conditions for the market economy
and those in the planning problem, it is to be noted that (A2) and (A7) mean that ˙ ζ/ζ =
˙ ζ
∗
/ζ∗ = ρ − R. Therefore, in view of (A1) and (A6), we see that C∗/C =( ζ∗/ζ)
−1/σ stays
constant over time. Thus we may set ζ∗/ζ = μ∗, i.e. the relative welfare weight on the foreign
households in the planning problem. In addition, (A2) gives ζt = ζ0 exp
¡R ∞
t (ρ − Rs)ds
¢
.
Therefore, from the deﬁnitions of Ωt = B + pK and p = q/λ, the non-Ponzi game condition,


















Hence, the non-Ponzi game scheme the economy as a whole (condition (33c)) implies that
lime−ρtζt
qt
λtKt =0 , so that the transversality condition for the planing problem, limt→∞ e−ρtqtKt =
0, is established by setting ζt = λt. Since ζ∗






















This and (34a) ensure the transversality, condition limt→∞ e−ρtq∗
tK∗
t =0 , in the planning
problem.
To select the value of μ∗ in the planning problem, consider the intertemporal budget
constraints for the households in both countries. Due to the transversality as well as non-

















































t =¯ mCt, we thus obtain






















(wt + π1,t + π2,t)dt + Ω0
.
Therefore, if the converging path is uniquely given, the entire sequences of wages, proﬁts and
interest rate are determinate, and hence ¯ m is also uniquely selected under given levels of Ω0
30and Ω∗
0. In contrast, if there is a continuum of converging paths, the sequences of wages,
proﬁts and interest rate are indeterminate, which generates indeterminacy of ¯ m.
Finally, let us check the Walras law in the market economy. First, note that ˙ Ω + ˙ Ω∗ =
p ˙ K + p∗ ˙ K∗ + ˙ pK + ˙ p∗K∗. Thus adding up the ﬂow budget constraint for the households in
each country gives
p ˙ K + p∗ ˙ K∗ + ˙ pK + ˙ p∗K∗













p∗K∗ + w + w∗ − C − C∗. (A11)
By use of the full-employment conditions, K = K1 + K2 and 1=L1 + L2,w eo b t a i n







+ π1 + prK2 + wL2 + π2
= pY1 + Y2 − δK. (A12)
Similarly, it holds that
r∗p∗K∗ + w∗ + π∗
1 + π∗
2 = p∗Y ∗
1 + Y ∗
2 − δK∗. (A13)
Substituting (A12) and (A13) into (A11) and using Y1 = ˙ K + δK and Y ∗
1 = ˙ K∗ + δK∗, we
obtain the world market equilibrium condition of the consumption goods: Y2+Y ∗
2 = C +C∗.
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